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OPENING REMARKS*
DEAN DOUGLAS: Our next speaker is Akhil Amar, Sterling
Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale University.
As it happens, Professor Amar was a Yale College classmate of
Senator Whitehouse and then graduated a few years later from Yale
Law School where he was my friendly classmate. After serving as a
law clerk for Judge Stephen Breyer, Professor Amar returned to
Yale to join the Law School faculty in 1985. Professor Amar is one
of the most influential constitutional theorists in the United States.
The Supreme Court has invoked his work in the course of its
decision making on more than twenty instances. He is the author of
several leading books on the American Constitution, including The
Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction, America’s Constitution:
A Biography, and most recently a book that I will recommend
particularly for students in the room today, but for everyone:
America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We
Live By.
Professor Amar.
(Applause)
PROFESSOR AMAR: It is a very great pleasure and honor to be
here with you all back at William and Mary. It’s a special treat to
follow Senator Whitehouse—also a challenge, given his extraordi-
nary performance. Dean Douglas, it’s always great to see you again,
and also a special thanks to Neal Devins for helping to make this
possible. I guess I can’t help saying one other thing. As I walked into
this building, and I noticed the statue of George Wythe, teacher,
known by, among other things, his extraordinary students: Thomas
Jefferson, John Marshall, Henry Clay. Did I mention James
* This transcript has been lightly edited. The editors and staff of the Law Review
express our sincere gratitude to Professor Akhil Amar for giving us the opportunity to publish
his thought-provoking opening remarks.
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Monroe? There are others. And as I look out in the audience and
survey the schedule, I can’t help notice that I, too, have been blessed
over the years with extraordinary students, two of whom you will be
hearing from over the course of this event. So I love the idea of a law
school named for a teacher, celebrating a teacher, and a teacher in
part known for his students. So thank you so much for inviting me
back here.
At an event designed to encourage thought and discussion about
the jury—the civil jury, as a political institution—I would like us to
remember that the civil jury is a part of a larger jury family, a
family of political institutions. So what I’m going to talk about today
is what lessons we might learn if we think about the jury family.
Senator Whitehouse said blank jury, and he mentioned that some
people put in runaway. Well, the idea of blank jury, we talk about
civil jury, grand jury, criminal petit jury. There are a family of
juries. Now, once you start to think about the family of jury trials,
some of the history lesson that he has given to you is specific and
unique to the civil jury. Some of those quotations from history
revolve around juries more generally. So what might the civil jury
have to learn from grand juries and criminal petit juries once we
understand the jury family?
Here are a couple of thoughts. One, the grand jury is a sitting
body. Here it’s not as ad hoc as a civil jury, in which basically each
one is summoned into existence for a specific case, and that’s not
true of a grand jury. A grand jury convenes and hears a variety of
matters during the course of its tenure. And is it possible that the
civil jury had been at a disadvantage to some extent because of its
ad hoc quality? Earlier Senator Whitehouse and I were just briefly
talking about the similarities and differences between the House
and the Senate. And, of course, once one understands that juries are
structured as a branch of the judiciary—that is, the lower house of
a bicameral judiciary, judge and jury—the analogy of House and
Senate becomes not an outlandish one. And the House is—has less
continuity to it. Every two years one House dies. The Senate is a
more continuing body, and in that continuity, I think, it has certain
advantages over the House. And in the same way, is it possible that
the civil jury over the course of history has lost out to some extent,
vis-a-vis institutions that have more continuity and are less ad
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hoc—institutions like the judiciary or the bar and other powerful
interests.
Senator Whitehouse mentioned corporate interests that have
more continuity. A corporation never dies. And when we think about
the grand jury, we realize that this ad hoc nature of each jury on the
civil side—summoned into existence just for the parties in designer
fashion—is not an essential attribute of the jury as such, because
there’s another member of the jury family that doesn’t have quite
this ad hoc characteristic.
So, if we think about the jury family, is it possible to imagine jury
reforms in which, for example, we have by law an officer, an
ombudsperson—I won’t say an ombudsman anymore as Professor
Keswick was so scholarly, as Senator Whitehouse reminds us—an
ombudsperson tasked with protection of the jury’s interest as
distinct from the judge’s or the judicial system to try to soften to
some extent the disadvantage of the ad hoc civil jury.
Is it possible to imagine a civil jury could actually be summoned
into existence and hear a variety of cases over the course of a week
or two weeks, rather than be picked by the parties for each case,
subject, of course, to challenges for cause in any one of the cases
that came before a civil jury that happened to be one in which one
particular juror or another’s participation was improper. So that’s
a thought about what the civil jury might have to learn from the
grand jury.
What might it have to learn from the criminal petit jury? Maybe
this: that there’s a particular role for the civil jury in deciding a
dispute between two private persons, between, as the phrase goes,
unless you heard it quoted by Senator Whitehouse, between man
and man. But when we recall the criminal jury, we see a particular
and distinctive function of the jury in suits between government and
man. And one particularly important role that the civil jury might
need to play, even if it loses some of the power that it had across the
board at Founding, I think we want to be especially careful about
preserving the role of the civil jury in suits between government and
man, or perhaps I should say man and government.
In a criminal case, the government initiates a prosecution, and in
one very important parody, now civil cases, an individual who had
been intruded upon by government might sue a government official
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who trespassed against him in an unreasonable way—committed an
unreasonable search or seizure. The Fourth Amendment, you may
recall, originally was about protecting innocent people from
unjustified intrusion, and the civil jury played an important role, of
course, in deciding whether the government intrusion was, in fact,
reasonable—a mixed question of fact and law.
And even if the role of the civil jury is eroding in other ways,
preserving its role in cases between man and government, the
government has abused a man. The man goes to court either as
plaintiff or defense. As I see my friend Ilya [Somin] here, it made me
think about just compensation cases, you know, when the govern-
ment is actually initiating a condemnation action against a property
owner, or in a reverse condemnation proceeding, where the property
owner says you’ve taken my property, and you haven’t given me
proper compensation.
Is there a role for a civil jury in deciding what compensation
would truly be just? A set of—a jury composed of people who at one
level are going to be the taxpayers whose tax money is going to be
funneled through the government to pay for just compensation
claims, ultimately, to pay for lawsuits brought against errant
officials who search and seize unreasonably. So at one level, a civil
jury can understand the legitimate needs of government, and on the
other side, can see themselves as the intruded upon individual and
can perhaps sympathize with that man or that person and be a very
good and proper balancer or decision maker.
The Supreme Court of late has tended to think that questions of
reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment are pure questions of law
not fit for a jury determination, but for judicial determination, and
I wonder about that. And the criminal jury is a reminder that juries
do more actually than narrowly decide facts. They decide mixed
questions of law and fact. On the criminal side, they decide ques-
tions of law of confrication, which is actually a fifth-century phrase.
We have a general verdict on the criminal side, specifically say
not guilty. And in doing so, they have a certain policy function, a
political function, alongside with their narrow fact-finding function.
So does a grand jury for that matter. It can simply refuse to indict
even if the facts permit an indictment. They can just say no, and so
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can the criminal jury just say no, and that is that. Acquittal. No
appeal. No retrial. No double jeopardy.
And there are at least questions about whether that more
political and policy-soaked law and fact together role of the jury on
the criminal side, even if inappropriate, across the entire range of
civil litigation might be particularly appropriate in disputes
between man and man and in suits between man and government.
The jury is designed in part to keep a professional government,
official government in check. Okay. So much for what the civil jury
might learn from other members of the jury family. What might it
teach other members of the jury family, other political institutions
that are also called juries that have the same last name but a
different first name?
There is, I think, an interesting harmony between the idea of
holding the scales evenly between man and man on the civil side
and the idea of a mere preponderance of evidence being a relevant
standard on the civil side, and the idea that in some civil suits, the
juries may not be unanimous. Civil majorities may suffice to do civil
justice.
Now, what might that tell us about the criminal side? Because
here, actually, there’s not a preponderance of the evidence standard.
There’s proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The scales are supposed
to be designed to favor the individual, the man against the govern-
ment, if there is genuine doubt about the man’s guilt. Do the voting
rules of the criminal jury sensibly reflect that idea? They require
unanimity to convict. So, okay, but they also require unanimity to
acquit. Does that make sense? Is it possible—and once you under-
stand this, you see juries need not be unanimous. Civil juries aren’t
always—grand juries for that matter don’t need to be unanimous.
Lots of political institutions don’t need to be unanimous. And
as—okay, I’ll say it—dysfunctional as the Senate at times can be
(imagine how dysfunctional it would be with a rule of a hundred)
really the high noon of consent, and sometimes they do act as if, you
know, it’s a rule of unanimity. But courts don’t have to be unani-
mous, and the Senate doesn’t always have to be unanimous, and the
House doesn’t always have to be unanimous, and yet grand juries
and civil juries may not be.
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So, on the criminal side, is it possible to imagine that we have
asymmetry rules for criminal justice tracking the asymmetric rules
of proof, something like nine: three sufficing to convict. Anything
less than nine counting an as acquittal, double jeopardy attaches.
That’s how impeachment works. To go back to the Senate for just a
second, senators act as judges and jurors deciding law and fact, and
two-thirds is required to convict, and anything less counts as an
acquittal asymmetrically. So once we start to see the jury as a
member of a family of political institution, perhaps it has something
to tell us about criminal jury reform.
Why would you ever want to move away from unanimity? It might
be necessary as a practical matter to move away from unanimity as
we let more people be jurors. Because we know it’s no longer man
and man, and white man and white man. And unanimity at the
Founding on juries may have been accomplished by broad exclusions
of folks who weren’t even able to climb into the jury box. And if we
open the jury box to more diverse citizenry, it may be unrealistic to
imagine that the juries will always be able to achieve unanimity,
just as it’s not realistic to imagine that the Senate will always be
able to achieve unanimity. So those are a couple of thoughts about
what the civil jury might have to teach other institutions or that it
might have to learn from other institutions.
Now, just a couple of thoughts about reaching beyond the jury
family, narrowly understood, to rethink other political institutions
that might learn from the model of the jury. Let’s think about
voting. You have a right to vote. Do you have a duty to vote? You
have a right to serve on the jury, but also a duty, and we enforce
that duty. I mean, it’s a responsibility of citizenship along with a
right, and if that’s true of jury service, could we think of voting that
way? There are other great democratic societies that have manda-
tory voting. One needn’t vote for the Democrat or the Republican
and is allowed to vote none of the above, but voting is a duty rather
than a right.
In some ways, maybe it makes more sense to enforce the duty of
voting now on the jury, because if you serve on the jury, you can
make a difference. On a criminal jury today, actually, your vote will
be decisive, given unanimity rules, and even in grand juries and
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civil juries, it’s a small enough group that one person’s vote on that
body might make a difference.
I’m going to say something here that may shock some of you, but
some of you were taught by your third-grade teacher you should
vote because your vote might make a difference. If your third-grade
teacher told you that, either she was lying, or she never took a basic
poli-sci class. Because here’s the truth.
Your vote will never make a difference. If it’s close, someone
counting the votes will cheat. And if it’s not close, it’s not going to
make a difference. That’s not why you vote. You vote because you
have a duty to vote, because you have a responsibility to vote. Do
you refrain from committing murder because you might get caught?
You refrain from committing murder because you know it’s the right
thing to do, and so is voting, and so is serving on the jury. But
precisely because actually there are fewer intrinsic rewards of
voting than in jury service, maybe we should supplement the
intrinsic rewards of voting. Basically, just standing in a long line
thus the intrinsic reward with a duty to vote, and this becomes less
preposterous, less foreign-sounding, less Australian, if you will, once
we see that the leaning is on the jury side, the entire jury family.
You have a duty to vote (inaudible). Juries vote. They deliberate.
They talk to each other. They listen to each other. You have—as a
voter, you have a duty not just to vote but to listen. Alongside the
freedom of speech is there a duty to listen? And if so, how might
that be enforced? So maybe before you vote, you actually have to
hear the arguments on both sides. That’s your duty as a citizen.
Now, voting is no longer a ten-minute proposition. You know,
warfare and fraud is a six-hour proposition. It’s maybe a day-long
proposition, more than a day-long proposition. And so here we come,
for example, to a proposed reform. It’s in the jury tradition that
before you vote—this is building on Professors Ackerman and
Fishman.
In some ways, I think it has some family resemblances to some of
the work that Professor Reeves has done, again deliberative
democracy in which actually people listen to each other, speak to
each other, learn about the issues, and then they vote.
So you’re summoned a week before the election just like jury duty,
and you show up, and you listen to the arguments on both sides
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made by the candidates on this amazing thing called television—on
videos. You can actually hear the candidates for different offices
making their pitches back and forth, and then you sit around a room
with fellow Americans, and you actually talk about what you’ve just
heard once a day. Because it’s a day, you should be paid for your
time just like you are in jury service. We make it a duty to do that.
We actually listen to each other and talk to each other. And
now—again, I’m coming here to a closing—that model, which is a
jury model (oh, and maybe because people just tend to live alongside
folks who are very like-minded, this is political science work about
the big sort) maybe we actually hook up juries electronically
through Skype and other things, juries from different districts.
Maybe we should actually talk to each other a little bit a week
before the elections—ordinary people talking to other ordinary
people about their common political life. See, because right now,
when ordinary people talk to other ordinary people, the discourse is:
Will you have fries with that, sir? That’s what citizens (inaudible)
is American. Will you have fries with that, sir?
It’s not political, and that’s not a self-governing society on the
model of the jury as a political family. What I’ve just suggested,
which is not really my idea—it’s Reeves’s and Bruce Ackerman’s and
Jim Fishman’s—this is taking the idea of the jury family, and
enlisting it in the name of (inaudible), one of the biggest challenges
of our era, which is campaign finance reform and anticorruption.
See, because you can’t bribe all the jurors [or] all these citizens.
They are secret bound. You can give them money. They can still vote
for whoever they want. But our elections right now are dominated
by money because people are ignorant, because they are only getting
their information in these thirty-second soundbites. And you have
a thing like deliberation day on the model of the jury—it’s a duty to
show up, and we have to listen and speak and engage other folks.
Now a thirty-second ad doesn’t buy you as much because actually
between that thirty-second ad and election day, we have juries
across America thinking about their common political life. This is
anticorruption. Remember what Hamilton said: The jury is an
anticorruption device. So it might seem we’ve come a very long way
from the idea of the civil jury to this democracy day, deliberation
day together, I suggest to you that the idea of the jury, the civil jury
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as a political institution, let’s think about our other political
institutions. If the idea of the jury is this fundamental[ly] demo-
cratic—it’s about people power, more generally; and if the brief idea
of a civil jury is known as, well, civil, can we think about other ways
of making our politics more generally, well, civil?
Thank you very much.
